Win-Now Mode

There has been no shortage of discussion on the short-term prospects of Minnesota Vikings head coach Mike Zimmer and general manager Rick Spielman. Reports that Zimmer was potentially on the chopping block ahead of their playoff game against the Saints in 2019 and a lackluster 2020 have accelerated the perception that both Zimmer and Spielman are on short leashes.

Their free agency moves have been slanted toward immediate wins — the Vikings agreed to a number of one-year contracts with veterans, including several who might be on the back end of their career. Their only serious multiyear contract was for a high-end starter expected to make an immediate impact on the roster.

The team needed to create new cap space to incorporate all of these contracts, so they let some veterans go, restructured other contracts and shortened the potential window of some of their players. At the same time, they made sure to hold on to players that any rebuilding team might see fit to trade away: Harrison Smith might be a more valuable asset to have in the short term over Anthony Harris, but in the long term, he might be more of a liability.

So far, this seems to be in alignment — a regime that needs results right away has prioritized making immediate gains. But their draft strategy seems to run counter to that overall theme.

That’s not necessarily a bad thing. Any competitive team will want to secure short-term victories and a playoff run while making sure they have players in place to take over in the future. It defined the Buccaneers’ approach this offseason, and they haven’t been criticized for it.

But the Vikings have seemingly taken long-term payoffs to the extreme despite having several needs on their roster that might need more immediate attention. While Christian Darrisaw and Wyatt Davis are expected to contribute as starters right away, the rest of the draft class takes a fairly long-term view, even after accounting for the fact that third- and fourth-rounders typically aren’t expected to contribute right away.

Third-round pick Kellen Mond looked predictably behind in rookie minicamp. That’s not cause for alarm, but it reinforces the idea that they didn’t draft the quarterback to play this year – something we already knew given the amount of money guaranteed in Kirk Cousins’ contract over the next two years.

The rest of the draft class, seemingly by design, is unlikely to contribute much this year, either. The most obvious example is fifth-round pick Zach Davidson, a tight end who also punted for Central Missouri, a Division-II program. While Davidson racked up a fair amount of yardage at tight end in his final year, it’s the only year he was a starter.

He’s not the only one with limited playing time at his position. Their third pick in the draft, Chazz Surratt, was another player who spent the majority of his time in college at quarterback, but the Vikings drafted him to play linebacker, the position he played his final two years at North Carolina. To Surratt’s credit, he picked up the position fairly quickly and generated a surprising amount of production — perhaps because he also had high school experience at linebacker — but he is nevertheless substantially behind in his development at the position.

Minnesota has room for immediate upgrades at both linebacker and tight end. While the tight end position doesn’t require a starter or immediate contributions as a subpackage player, the team that led the NFL in two-tight end sets could use a third tight end for rotational purposes as well as for immediate injury help.

At linebacker, the Vikings don’t have a clear solution for their “base” defense, where a third linebacker would be brought on to help with two-tight end offenses or on obvious running downs. Cameron Smith or Troy Dye may be asked to contribute in that role, but Dye struggled last year and Smith is coming back after a year away from football due to heart surgery. Neither is anything close to a sure bet.

In response to losing Mike Boone — a critical part of the injury replacement strategy — the Vikings only added Kene Nwangwu, an Iowa State running back with enticing athleticism but very little experience. Though he didn’t switch positions in college, sitting behind David Montgomery and Breece Hall — who will, barring injury, almost certainly be selected high in next year’s draft — meant he earned very few touches. He totaled just 143 carries and seven receptions in college.

That means receiver Rondale Moore, who only played 20 games in college due to injury, had more career touches with 208, despite playing 28 fewer games. In fact, Moore had more carries in his freshman year as a wide receiver — his only full season — than Nwangwu had in his junior year.

Nwangwu will have a good chance to contribute right away, but it will be primarily as a competitor for the kick- and punt-return jobs, a kick-coverage player or a punt protector.

Ihmir Smith-Marsette is not in an identical situation — he led Iowa in receiving for two consecutive years — but he’s not exactly seasoned, either. He was primarily a cornerback recruit coming out of high school and only started playing football in his sophomore year, much later than many D-I recruits, who often start playing in or before middle school.

With only 69 receptions in his final two years of college, he didn’t see the ball too often compared to other prospects and has a lot of work to do to become a functional route runner. The five receivers picked nearest to Smith-Marsette averaged 88 receptions and in their final years averaged 5.3 receptions per game, compared to Smith-Marsette’s 3.6.

His strength profile is chock full of praise for his physical capabilities and even some more subtle nuances to his game, but his weaknesses are all related to his ability to play the technical side of football, particularly as a route runner. It’s possible, though unlikely, he contributes in a major way as a third receiver, another need for the team. Though the Vikings profess to like Chad Beebe, they were reluctant to pay $2.1 million to tender him, allowing him to hit free agency. They offered him the veteran minimum instead.

The Vikings could have used an instant upgrade at edge rusher, as well. But the edge rushers they picked don’t seem like plug-and-play starters. Again, that’s not necessarily a criticism. None of the starters they’ve had in the Zimmer era have been plug-and-play types — all developed as mid-round picks who saw the field as rotational rushers before earning a full-time role.

But in the Zimmer era, the Vikings never needed a starter to come in and play right away — well, not until this year. Patrick Jones II from Pitt only started playing football as a freshman in high school and first saw playing time at defensive end in his junior year. Janarius Robinson has more experience but also started playing football seriously late in his recruiting career — as a sophomore — and is generally considered a developmental prospect who will need time to develop.

The Vikings ignored cornerback, a position where one could justifiably argue they have an immediate need given the off-field concerns surrounding Jeff Gladney and the decision to trade away Mike Hughes. Instead, they opted to bolster the safety room, one without established depth and which also could use some medium-term security.

The player they drafted at the position, Camryn Bynum, played corner throughout his high school and college career. In his draft guide, Dane Brugler compared Bynum’s potential transition to safety to that of Bills safety Jordan Poyer. Poyer, a seventh-round pick, didn’t see any playing time until his fourth year in the NFL despite a productive college career at corner.

Others converted right away with no transition time. For most players, however, a transition to a new position takes time, and that’s likely to be the case for Bynum as well. Though all the defensive backs met together at Cal and they have a “defensive backs” coach instead of a cornerback coach or a safety coach, much like the Vikings, actual practice reps at the position will be necessary before the Vikings trust him to take up serious playing time.

After that, it’s just sixth-round pick Jalen Twyman, who will need to reshape his body after opting out of the 2021 season and gaining weight. The Vikings have asked him to get closer to his playing weight at Pitt, 285 pounds, which might help him achieve the quickness he demonstrated in his wildly successful 2019 campaign as an interior pass rusher. The path to playing time in 2021 should not be inhibited by having to learn the position, but he isn’t likely to see many snaps given the free-agent investment along the defensive interior.

All in all, the Vikings have clearly pivoted to a strategy that prioritizes long-term development despite having short-term needs at a number of critical positions. If one has to choose one direction or another — not always the case in the middle rounds — it doesn’t always bode poorly for the team. But it does mean that any hanging cloud over Spielman and Zimmer hasn’t impacted the way that they approach the draft.

It could either mean that they don’t let questions about their job status impact the way they approach player acquisition or that those questions are merely external, with little pressure from ownership.

The Vikings should see immediate returns from at least two of their rookies, so it’s unlikely that fans will be expecting much more from the 2021 draft class. But in two years, there will likely be some questions about the rest of the class.

Many of these players won’t make the roster, instead competing with undrafted free agents for spots on the practice squad. Again, that’s to be expected. The draft class this year was smaller than it has been in decades. In most years, teams spend sixth- and seventh-round picks on players they grade as priority free agents, and it’s likely that this year, they spent fifth- or even fourth-round picks on priority free agents. Some teams even exhausted their pool of free agents, with some signing fewer than four free agents — or none at all.

It might seem like an unusual practice to spend a fifth-round pick on a player you don’t even expect to make the roster, but it’s unlikely that they’d be able to trade for future picks given the consensus across the NFL that future picks are more valuable than normal. Good luck finding a trade partner when everyone agrees that the asset you want costs more than normal.

Given those circumstances, it seems like the Vikings bet on long-term upside over short-term gain. Facing the prospect of a more developed player with less upside who might be able to contribute immediately versus a prospect who they judge to have significant upside without a chance to contribute early on, they opted for the latter.

Dozens of front offices made similar choices, but it’s interesting that the Vikings chose to do so consistently given how poor last year’s team was, the questions surrounding the security of the leadership and the holes remaining on the roster.